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WHY COMPARABILITY IS A GREATER PROBLEM
THAN GREENWASHING IN ESG ETFS
DR. RYAN CLEMENTS
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that comparability in environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) exchange traded funds (ETFs) is a
much greater problem than greenwashing. Rising demand for sustainable investment products in recent years has been met with
an explosion in ESG ETF varieties, and numerous ESG-themed
funds have captured massive capital inflows. There is little evidence,
however, that deceptive “greenwashing” is widespread in ETFs.
ETF issuers face significant reputational costs from such behavior, and there are effectively no consumer switching costs for hyperliquid, easily accessible ETFs. While nondeceptive practices of asset
managers are observable in the zero-sum, highly competitive, asset
management game of capturing new ESG-directed capital flows, the
subjectivity that ETF issuers use to integrate ESG considerations
into the composition of underlying ETF holdings is so disparate that
investors face tremendous information acquisition and synthesis
costs, and difficulty comparing products. This dilemma grows as
product choice expands. ESG ETFs also create unique issuer and
commercial index provider conflicts. An investor focused regulatory
framework for ESG ETFs would aid comparability, standardization, and consistent product marketing presentation. To this end,
this Article builds on the author’s prior work on comparative complexity in ETFs by advancing three immediate measures to improve
comparability and facilitate more efficient capital allocation in ESG
ETF varieties: first, require justification of a fund’s usage of ESG
terminology in its name through specific ETF disclosures; second,
standardize ESG measurement metrics; and third, mandate uniform information presentation layouts on ETF issuer websites.

Assistant Professor, Chair Business Law and Regulation, University of
Calgary Faculty of Law. Special thanks to Ryan Amaral for excellent research
assistance. The author also wishes to thank Bryce Tingle, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.,
Lawrence Baxter, and Lee Reiners for helpful insights. The views expressed,
and any remaining inaccuracies, are solely those of the author.

441

442 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:441
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 443
I. SUSTAINABLE INVESTING AND THE RISE OF ESG ETFS ........... 447
A. Defining ESG in the Exchange Traded Universe ............. 447
B. The Rise and Impact of ESG and Sustainable
Investing .............................................................................. 450
C. Capital Flows and Product Proliferation in ESG ETFs .. 454
II. ESG INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND COMPARISON COSTS ... 456
A. Comparability Is a Greater Problem Than Greenwashing
in ETFs ................................................................................ 456
B. Information Acquisition Costs and Comparative
Complexity ........................................................................... 460
C. Commercial ESG Index Providers and ETF Issuer Bespoke
ESG Indices ......................................................................... 464
III. HOW ESG ETF COMPARATIVE OPACITY HARMS
INVESTORS ............................................................................... 465
A. It’s ESG, But Not Exactly What I Thought I Purchased .. 465
B. Evaluating Financial Performance and Broad Market
Correlation .......................................................................... 468
C. Is it E, S, or G? Just Trust Us ... We’re ESG! ................... 469
IV. HOW TO IMPROVE COMPARABILITY IN ESG ETFS ................. 474
A. Step One: Justify ESG Name Usage in Specific ETF
Disclosures........................................................................... 474
B. Step Two: Standardize ESG ETF Measurement
Metrics ................................................................................. 479
C. Step Three: Uniform Information Presentation Style on
Websites ............................................................................... 481
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 485

2022] WHY COMPARABILITY IS A GREATER PROBLEM 443
INTRODUCTION
Rising demand for investment products that are “sustainable” or “responsible” has been met with an explosion in environmental, social, and governance (collectively, ESG) exchange
traded fund (ETF) varieties.1 Numerous ESG-designated funds
have captured massive capital inflows2 in what is likely the most
popular investment product since the 2008 global financial crisis—
the ETF.3 The media over the last several years has frequently
cited concerns of “greenwashing”4 in relation to growth in ESG
investing, including in ETFs.5 There is little evidence, however,

See Peter Krull, Opinion: Buyer Beware: What’s Really in Your ‘EarthFriendly’ ESG Fund?, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2021, 1:01 PM), https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/buyer-beware-whats-really-in-your-earth-friendly-esg
-fund-11615485716 [https://perma.cc/9XFN-PYYH]; infra Section I.B.
2 See Paul Blow, What Is Greenwashing? Here Is What Investors Need to
Know, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2020, 8:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what
-is-greenwashing-here-is-what-investors-need-to-know-11604881371 [https://
perma.cc/B2TC-EAAT]; infra Section I.C.
3 See Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail?, 22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 772, 788–94 (2020) [hereinafter Clements,
Too Interconnected].
4 Greenwashing is a term that has been frequently used in the media over the
last several years to describe when a corporation or investment asset manager
purports to integrate meaningful environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
considerations into their decision-making processes, but in reality, they are
merely creating a “false impression” and generally misleading the public. See
Celia A. Soehner & G. Jeffrey Boujoukos, ESG Disclosures and Traps for the
Unwary—What’s Workable?, REUTERS (June 30, 2021, 11:57 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/esg-disclosures-traps-unwary-whats-work
able-2021-06-30/ [https://perma.cc/SJ9J-YTJF]. Greenwashing could be a particularly lucrative temptation in the asset management industry because of
tremendous recent investor demand for “sustainable” investment products that
are characterized around ESG considerations. See Huw Jones, Regulators to
Tighten Scrutiny of Asset Managers to Stop ‘Greenwashing’, REUTERS (June 30,
2021, 10:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/regu
lators-tighten-scrutiny-asset-managers-stop-greenwashing-2021-06-30/ [https://
perma.cc/FY79-6899].
5 See Krull, supra note 1; Blow, supra note 2; Tim Quinson, Al Gore Warns
Greenwashing May Stop the Climate Fight in Its Tracks, YAHOO FIN. (July 13,
2021, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-13/al-gore
-warns-greenwashing-may-stop-climate-fight-in-its-tracks-green-insight [https://
perma.cc/C3Y3-LW5B]; Shaheen Contractor, Cleaning up ETF ESG Greenwashing, ETF STRATEGY (May 20, 2021), https://www.etfstrategy.com/cleaning-up
-etf-esg-greenwashing-98547/ [https://perma.cc/HE7P-FTER]; Tom Eckett, Are
Climate Change ETFs Greenwashing?, ETF STREAM (Feb. 1, 2021), https://
1
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that this is the case.6 The most pressing concern in ESG ETFs is
not greenwashing—it is side-by-side comparability.7 Due to a lack
of requirements tying the ESG name and terminology usage to
specific ETF disclosures, non-standardized ESG scoring metrics,
and discretionary information presentation methods on websites
by ETF issuers, ESG investors face a formidable task attempting to compare ESG objective ETFs.8 If not remedied, this could
cause significant investor harm and capital misallocation.9
ETF issuers face significant reputational costs from engaging in greenwashing, and the consumer-switching costs of
hyper-liquid, ultra-fee sensitive, easily accessible ETFs are effectively zero.10 Yet the terms and practices associated with integrating ESG considerations into investment products, like ETFs,
vary considerably.11 While nondeceptive efforts to integrate sustainable and responsible investment factors are likely being deployed by asset managers in the zero-sum, highly competitive
game of capturing new ESG-directed capital flows, the subjectivity that ETF managers use to integrate such considerations into
the composition of underlying ETF holdings is so disparate that
investors face tremendous information acquisition, synthesis
costs, and difficulty comparing products.12

www.etfstream.com/features/are-climate-change-etfs-greenwashing/ [https://
perma.cc/7L8M-M2XE]; Brittany Damico, Greenwashing, ETF TRENDS (Sept. 26,
2020), https://www.etftrends.com/esg-channel/greenwashing/ [https://perma.cc
/FW7E-2L7L]; Dale Jackson, ‘Greenwashing’ in ETFs: Why Some Socially Responsible Funds May Be Misleading Investors, GLOB. AND MAIL (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/etfs/article-etfs-can-help
-build-an-environmentally-friendly-portfolio-but-beware/ [https://perma.cc
/57LT-7KZ5].
6 See Soehner & Boujoukos, supra note 4; infra Section II.A.
7 See Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and
Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1943, 1997
(2020).
8 See id. at 1940–42, 1947, 1997–2001.
9 See id. at 1943, 1997; Ryan Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion: How
Industry Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds,
15 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 125, 166 (2021) [hereinafter Clements, Exchange-Traded
Confusion]; infra Part III.
10 See Clements, Too Interconnected, supra note 3, at 792–93; infra Part II.
11 See R. BOFFO & R. PATALANO, OECD PARIS, ESG INVESTING: PRACTICES,
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 32–34 (2020).
12 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 128–31; infra
Section II.B.
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The ETF market provides a perfect test case to study the
problems resulting from ESG product choice “overload.”13 This
Article builds on the author’s prior work showing how ETFs, as
a generalized investment product class, are nearly impossible to
perform a true “apples to apples” product comparative analysis,
due to a wide array of discretionary operational, management, and
financial practices of ETF issuers that obscure and undermine simple
ETF product and performance comparisons.14 It also compliments
other legal scholars’ recently conducted work showing how the ESG
investment space is creating significant consumer protection concerns given its quick expansion, wide variety of product offerings,
and largely opaque investment decision-making methodologies.15
This Article shows how some of these comparative pathologies are particularly acute in the ETF ESG subproduct segment.16
As such, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC), and other global regulators’, primary focus in this increasingly popular investment product segment should be ease of comparability, standardization, and consistent product marketing
presentation.17 Without requiring justification when a fund uses
an ESG term in its name,18 standardizing ESG measurement and
scoring metrics,19 and mandating simplified and uniform issuer
website layout standards for ESG information presentation by
See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 166 (“ETFs
present a prime case study of the dual cognitive frictions of ‘information overload’
and the ‘paradox of choice.’ Maximum information dissemination is not efficient if the costs of impaired decision-making outweigh the marginal benefits.
The deleterious impact of ‘information overload’ on investors has been well
documented, as has the ‘limited attention’ of consumers in general. Research
has also shown that lengthy disclosures can be ineffective. A prospective ETF
investor has an exhaustive (and largely unrealistic) plight in attempting to
navigate, for multiple comparative fund choices, cumulatively dense and voluminous ETF fact sheets, summary and full prospectus, SAI, and ongoing disclosures like semi-annual and annual reports to get a clear and comprehensive
side-by-side picture.”).
14 See id. at 128–29.
15 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1925–29.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1940–42; infra Section IV.A.
19 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1940, 1998–2001; infra Section IV.B.
13
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ETF issuers,20 ESG ETFs will continually expose investors to
harm and potential capital misallocation.21
There are now more than three hundred combined ETFs and
mutual funds that have sustainable investing as a core strategy,
two-thirds of which are equity funds.22 An investor focused regulatory framework for ESG ETFs would aid comparability, standardization, and consistent product marketing presentation.23 To
this end, the Article builds on this author’s prior work on comparative complexity in ETFs by advancing three immediate measures
to improve comparability and facilitate more efficient capital allocation in ESG ETF varieties: first, require ETF firms to justify in
their disclosures why they used a sustainable term in their name;
second, standardize ESG measurement and scoring metrics; and
third, mandate uniform information presentation layouts on ETF
issuer websites.24
Greenwashing grabs the headlines by evoking emotions—
envisioning nefarious investment issuers unscrupulously manipulating vulnerable investors—but it oversimplifies, obscures, and
distracts from the greater issue.25 ESG ETFs are commonly incorporating sustainability measures with tremendous subjectivity,
using an unregulated, non-standardized universe of available
names, metrics, and methodologies.26 This is creating a product
comparison nightmare.27 Without specific regulatory intervention,
ESG ETFs expose investors to continual harm and potential capital
and risk misallocation.28 Enhanced ESG ETF product choices
generate information acquisition and synthesis costs, increase

See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1940, 1947, 1997; Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 184; infra Section IV.C.
21 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1943, 1997.
22 See Jon Hale, Are Sustainable Equity Funds Doing What They Claim to
Be Doing?, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Hale, Sustainable Equity],
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973152/are-sustainable-equity-funds-doing
-what-they-claim-to-be-doing [https://perma.cc/BR4K-S52X].
23 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 187–94.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 128–30; infra
Section I.A.
26 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 129–31; infra
Parts II, III.
27 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 129.
28 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1943, 1997; infra Part III.
20
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complexity for investors, while incentivizing unique ETF issuer
and commercial index provider conflicts.29
The Article will proceed in Part I by first identifying the
factors influencing investor demand for ESG investment products, in particular the ETF form where product variety has proliferated.30 This Part will also look at the variable definition of
ESG, including the many emerging subcomponents and evaluation determinants, and will canvas the debate around whether ESG
investments are creating real world sustainable impacts or otherwise generating investment return alpha.31
Part II will show why comparability is a much greater
problem than greenwashing and how ETF issuers have significant incentives to avoid such behavior.32 It will review numerous
studies showing ESG integration into ETFs and show how ETF
issuers use ESG evaluation discretion, non-standardized (or justified) fund name usage, variable ESG scoring processes and metrics,
and discretionary index construction methodologies to create incredible information acquisition and synthesis costs for investors.33
Part III shows how these information costs harm investors and
impede efficient capital and risk allocation.34 Finally, Part IV shows
how these costs can be mitigated and comparability improved by
requiring ETFs to justify in their disclosures their usage of ESG
terminology in their fund name, having the regulator develop
standardized measurement metrics, and requiring uniform ESG
information presentation layouts in ETF issuer websites.35
I.SUSTAINABLE INVESTING AND THE RISE OF ESG ETFS
A. Defining ESG in the Exchange Traded Universe
Passive indexing, which includes ETFs, now accounts for
nearly half of the entire U.S. stock market.36 The ESG ETF variety

See infra Part III.
See infra Section I.C.
31 See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
32 See infra Section II.A.
33 See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
34 See infra Part III.
35 See infra Part IV.
36 See Jeff Cox, Passive Investing Automatically Tracking Indexes Now
Controls Nearly Half the US Stock Market, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:56 PM),
29
30
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is an increasingly popular product subclass. ESG ETF investors
are fueled by a desire for meaningful social change, a belief that
ESG considerations are “an integral part of sound investing” and
will generate higher potential returns, and a conviction that investment managers can have a significant influence on the actions of corporations.37 ESG investing evokes “emotional drivers”
which many financial advisors are actively tapping.38
Millennial investors, many of whom are powered by fintech trading applications like Robinhood,39 have also shown a
significant interest in ESG ETFs.40 There has also been a surge
in demand for ESG products by pensions, sovereign wealth
funds, insurance companies and institutional investors,41 as well
as by foundations and charities.42 However, the United States
does not currently have clearly defined standards for what constitutes ESG in ETF products43 and there are no regulated,

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/19/passive-investing-now-controls-nearly-half
-the-us-stock-market.html [https://perma.cc/MBJ4-GJBZ].
37 See Factors behind the Growing Popularity of ESG Investing, NASDAQ
(Apr. 24, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/factors-behind-the
-growing-popularity-of-esg-investing-2021-04-24 [https://perma.cc/4EUP-RY84].
38 See Sally Hickey, Advisers Need to Tap Into ESG Emotional Drivers, Says
Aviva, FT ADVISER (May 24, 2021), https://www.ftadviser.com/investments
/2021/05/24/advisers-need-to-tap-into-esg-emotional-drivers-says-aviva/ [https://
perma.cc/6TEF-6GX9].
39 See Stephen McBride, Millennials Will Propel Stocks Higher for Years,
FORBES (Feb. 8, 2021, 9:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Stephenmcbride1
/2021/02/08/millennials-will-propel-stocks-higher-for-years/?sh=5a9a11326e5d
[https://perma.cc/E6H4-YHDD]; Rob Walker, How Robinhood Convinced Millennials to Trade Their Way through a Pandemic, MARKER (June 1, 2020), https://
marker.medium.com/how-robinhood-convinced-millennials-to-trade-their-way
-through-a-pandemic-1a1db97c7e08 [https://perma.cc/AWY9-B5W7].
40 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 17; Meagan Andrews & Shrinal
Sheth, Why ESG Exchange-Traded Funds Might Not Be as Green as You
Think, WORLD ECON. F. (July 8, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021
/07/esg-exchange-traded-funds-not-as-green-as-you-think/
[https://perma.cc
/JVB5-THXC].
41 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1978–80.
42 Id. at 1986–87.
43 Claire Ballentine, Big Oil Is Boosting ETF Returns and ESG Funds Are No
Exception, BNN BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/big
-oil-is-boosting-etf-returns-and-esg-funds-are-no-exception-1.1597472 [https://
perma.cc/QLZ2-3DJY] (“The inclusion of oil companies in a green fund points
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or even generally accepted, standards for what good ESG is or is
not.44
In its simplest form in the context of asset management,
ESG refers to investment products that select for companies (or
in the case of an ETF, an index that includes such companies)
that integrate “environmental,” “social,” or “governance” mandates into their firm operations.45 Common environmental goals
include decreasing carbon emissions, “green energy production,”
and firms engaged in positive biodiversity and reforestation initiatives.46 Social factors include “consideration of people and relationships” such as an underlying company’s gender and diversity
practices, labor standards, and data protection.47 Additionally,
governance evaluates the oversight “standards” a firm integrates
including measures such as board and audit committee structure, executive compensation, whistleblower schemes, lobbying,
bribery, and corruption.48
The cumulative breadth of possible ESG considerations is
spectacular, and the level of resulting subjectivity this entails
for an asset manager or commercial index provider in choosing
constituent portfolio companies for an ETF index is tremendous.49
Adding to the complexity, as the SEC recently noted in a risk alert
examination review of ESG investing, ESG funds use different
mechanisms to integrate ESG altogether.50 Some funds integrate

to the lack of a clear definition—at least in the United States—for what constitutes ESG investing. Some funds like the Vanguard ESG US Stock ETF (ESGV)
take a more strict approach, excluding companies involved in adult entertainment, alcohol, tobacco, weapons, fossil fuels, gambling[,] and nuclear power.
Others such as Invesco Solar ETF (TAN) and First Trust Global Wind Energy
Fund (FAN) are focused on just one aspect of the broader ESG universe.”).
44 Alpay Soytürk, Danger of Being Corrupted? ESG Ratings Increase Risk
of Greenwashing, INV. WEEK, May 19, 2021, at 18.
45 See TrackInsight: ESG ETFs—The Ultimate Guide, TRACKINSIGHT (Apr. 29,
2021) [hereinafter TrackInsight: ESG ETFs], https://www.trackinsight.com
/news/esg-etfs-the-ultimate-guide-2/ [https://perma.cc/H7BN-R39Y].
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See SEC’S DIV. OF EXAMINATIONS, THE DIVISION OF EXAMINATIONS’ REVIEW
OF ESG INVESTING 1 (Apr. 9, 2021).
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ESG alongside “macroeconomic trends,” while others assess public
commitments of portfolio companies or apply “negative, positive,
or norms-based screens” in their investment process.51 Some use
ESG scores provided by independent ESG ratings providers.52
Funds may also use an “impact focus” strategy, which seeks a
“non-financial outcome,” and is inherently ambiguous given the
open-ended nature of some social or societal qualitative impact goals
like improvements in governance or climate risk practices.53
Other ETFs will employ “best in class,” or “exclusionary” (like
avoiding tobacco or oil and gas) rules in index inclusion, in which
case an asset manager directly incorporates ESG considerations in
discretionary index construction decisions.54 Others will attempt
to influence corporate policies through the proxy voting process, or
construct an ETF underlying index on the basis of a particular
ESG “theme.”55 There are also a host of “investment” strategies,
including “ESG Momentum” (which focuses on firms who are
showing promise in improving their ESG scores).56 The net result is
that ETF investors are left with a cornucopia of product choice
with very little (if any) standardized means of making adequate
comparative or evaluative judgments other than performance.57
B. The Rise and Impact of ESG and Sustainable Investing
Investor holdings in socially responsible investment products
have ballooned to more than thirty trillion in globally managed assets.58 In 2019, eleven U.S. mutual funds “rebranded” themselves as

Id.
See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 32.
53 Id. at 32–33.
54 See TrackInsight: ESG ETFs, supra note 45 (A “best in class approach”
entails a selection of “the most sustainable companies from each sector” which
would include the “best” company from generally unsustainable industries like
oil and gas or tobacco. An “exclusionary approach” looks to “exclude companies or
industries that do not meet minimum standards of sustainability based on international norms—often weapons manufacturers, tobacco companies[,] or fossil
fuel producers.”).
55 See RESPONSIBLE INV. ASS’N, 2020 CANADIAN RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
TRENDS REP. 7 (2020).
56 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 33.
57 Id. at 12.
58 See Kenneth P. Pucker, Overselling Sustainability Reporting, 99 HARV.
BUS. REV. 134, 137 (2021).
51
52
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ESG, part of a larger trend that has seen forty-two U.S. mutual
funds and 123 European mutual funds, since 2015, take similar
steps.59 Supporters of sustainable investing see it as a way for
powerful asset managers like BlackRock to positively enact social
and environmental change, and improve governance and disclosure,
by influencing management through proxy voting while raising
the capital costs of divested companies.60 ESG investing also may
allow firms to improve their reputation, improve customer and employee retention, and maintain the trust of shareholders during
periods of market uncertainty.61 Other studies indicate the possibility of enhanced returns or alpha generation through sustainable
investing.62 Also, it allows the “gears of capitalism” to catalyze
sustainable outcomes and foster socially popular businesses.63
Some believe, however, that asset managers serve as an
“impediment” to addressing real issues like climate change, while
sustainable investing acts as a “societal placebo” that delays regulatory reform.64 Others note the collateral rise in carbon emissions,

Dieter Holger, As Funds Jump on the ‘Sustainable’ Bandwagon, Regulators Raise Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2020, 10:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/as-funds-jump-on-the-sustainable-bandwagon-regulators-raise-con
cerns-11586103274 [https://perma.cc/F983-43ZH].
60 See The Impact of Green Investors, ECONOMIST (Mar. 27, 2021), https://
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/03/27/the-impact-of-green-in
vestors [https://perma.cc/87GE-M4UF] (noting the backlash against BlackRock for
investment in oil companies); see also BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at
11 (discussing benefits of sustainable investment).
61 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 11.
62 See Tim Verheyden et al., ESG for All? The Impact of ESG Screening on
Return, Risk, and Diversification, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 47, 50–51 (2016);
Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality,
91 ACCT. REV. 1697, 1716 (2016); Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon,
Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship Between Social Responsibility
and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGY MGMT. J. 1101, 1102 (2006); Gunnar
Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More
than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210, 226 (2015).
63 Down to Business, ESG ‘Fantasy’ Distracts from Real Climate Change
Fight, Says Former Blackrock Insider, FIN. POST, at 02:40 (May 5, 2021), https://
financialpost.com/commodities/energy/renewables/esg-fantasy-distracts-from
-real-climate-change-fight-says-former-blackrock-insider
[https://perma.cc
/HV5A-N6PG] (concluding that this approach does not successfully combat climate change).
64 See Bernard S. Sharfman, How BlackRock Strikes Out on the Issue of
Climate Change, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (May 21, 2021), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk
59



452 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:441
environmental damage, executive pay disparities, and income inequality alongside the explosion in ESG investing.65 Additionally,
some of the highest scoring ESG firms include technology giants
like Microsoft, Apple, and Intel, who continue to grow in global market power evoking ongoing anti-trust concerns. These technology
firms benefit from a lower cost of capital due to ESG fund inflows,
despite implementing complex tax avoidance and arbitrage strategies.66 There is also evidence that high scoring ESG companies
employ fewer people than does the average Russell 3000 company.67
Contrarian voices call ESG funds a “deadly distraction” from
the real problem of climate change. Tariq Fancy, BlackRock’s former Chief Investment Officer of Sustainable Investing, suggests
that the mega-asset manager’s “socially conscious” investment
practices are misleading, nothing more than “marketing hype” or
“PR spin” and that the “financial services industry is duping the
American public.”68 Also, recent research by ESG index provider
Scientific Beta suggests that ESG investing does not “generate
alpha” (outperform the market), and that claims to the contrary
are flawed, and do not apply “standard risk adjustments.”69 Relatedly, a recent study noted that “specialized” ETFs (a term that
surely characterizes ESG varieties) which are “appealing to investors,” deliver negative risk-adjusted returns, at higher fees,
/business-law-blog/blog/2021/05/how-blackrock-strikes-out-issue-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/D7CV-Z8RN].
65 See Pucker, supra note 58, at 137.
66 See Jamie Gordon, Cyclical Regime Change Represents First Real Test
for ESG ETFs, ETF STREAM (June 28, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/fea
tures/cyclical-regime-change-represents-first-real-test-for-esg-etfs/ [https://perma
.cc/57Q9-PX3Y].
67 Id.
68 See Tariq Fancy, Financial World Greenwashing the Public with Deadly
Distraction in Sustainable Investing Practices, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2021, 4:00
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/16/wall-street-esg-sustain
able-investing-greenwashing-column/6948923002/ [https://perma.cc/WSY6-S7NB];
Jason Bisnoff, Free Markets and ESG Investing Won’t Fix the Climate Crisis,
Says Former BlackRock Sustainability Chief, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2021, 11:09
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbisnoff/2021/03/30/free-markets-and-esg
-investing-wont-fix-the-climate-crisis-says-former-blackrock-sustainability-chief
/?sh=7c3ffe8d4c1f [https://perma.cc/T6UR-B3GJ].
69 Tom Eckett, ESG Does Not Generate Outperformance, Scientific Beta Warns,
ETF STREAM (May 5, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/features/esg-does-not
-generate-outperformance-scientific-beta-warns/ [https://perma.cc/DV6D-9BND].
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when the post fund launch interest dissipates.70 Other empirical
studies counter such evidence, however, and show that sustainable funds outperformed non-sustainable varieties during 2020.71
Although, the heavy tech stock overweighting of many ESG funds
may skew their recent performance.72
Some analysts believe that passive investment funds—a
classification that captures a large portion of the ETF product
universe—are less effective in achieving ESG objectives than are
“active” fund structures (including both actively managed mutual
funds, hedge funds, and actively managed ETFs73) because the
latter can engage in more impactful stewardship measures and
have greater flexibility in divesting underlying portfolio holdings
on the basis of ESG factors.74 Passive index products, on the other
hand, have limited leverage other than proxy voting, engagement
with portfolio companies, and waiting until an ETF issuer’s index review committee assesses the fund’s “index constituents,”
which usually only happens semi-annually.75 Mega-ETF issuers,
like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street have also been accused of employing a “low cost, low value” governance model by
excessively deferring to management and proxy advisors and
employing very few investment stewardship professionals.76

See Itzhak Ben-David et al., Competition for Attention in the ETF Space,
SSRN (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15762, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3783988 [https://perma.cc/PNN6-VY2G].
71 See Hortense Bioy, Do Sustainable Funds Beat Their Rivals?, MORNINGSTAR (June 16, 2020, 10:06 AM), https://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/203
214/do-sustainable-funds-beat-their-rivals.aspx [https://perma.cc/RPC8-5QC2];
Jon Hale, Sustainable Equity Funds Outperform Traditional Peers in 2020,
MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1017056
/sustainable-equity-funds-outperform-traditional-peers-in-2020 [https://perma.cc
/R99W-ABMS].
72 See Claire Ballentine, Wall Street Math Shows ESG Funds Can Ride the
Value Stock Boom, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2021, 11:11 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2021-04-08/big-tech-fueled-esg-returns-value-stocks-can
-takeover-next [https://perma.cc/C6JP-JUQG].
73 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 160.
74 Anna Devine, Rise of ESG Renews Debate over Whether Passive Funds
Can Deliver, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/6f79355b
-afe7-486a-b103-cb92cba91aed [https://perma.cc/2T7G-CE7D].
75 Id.
76 Gordon, supra note 66.
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C. Capital Flows and Product Proliferation in ESG ETFs
Investor capital flows in ESG ETFs have exploded from
$10 billion assets under management (AUM) in 2015, to $264
billion by the spring of 2021, while the number of ESG ETFs has
grown from 90 to 578 during the same time period.77 ETFs that
seek out particular ESG goals, like those “aligned with specific
goals like the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals or
women-owned businesses” grew over 223% during 2020.78 MegaETF issuer BlackRock saw twenty-two percent of global investment flows for all iShares products in 2021 flow into ESG and
other sustainable ETF varieties.79 Relatedly, investors have allocated forty percent of all 2021 investor capital flows in European
ETFs by mid-year to ESG strategy funds, with the SPDR Bloomberg SAD US Corporate ESG UCITS ETF alone seeing $5.5 billion in inflows during the same period.80
Drivers for the explosion of ESG investing include a desire
to hedge climate or litigation risk, or normative alignments such as
a desire to positively impact society.81 A 2021 global ETF marketplace data survey of ETF investors, financial advisors, and
fund managers by consultancy Brown Brothers Harriman reveals a significant trend in investor interest for ESG ETFs.82 Of

Attracta Mooney, ESG Benchmark Divergence No Barrier to Investor
Demand, FIN. TIMES (May 9, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/df328c34-6d9b
-4fe6-9074-74091ce23ac7 [https://perma.cc/9V3M-5LX3]; ETFGI Reports Assets
Invested in ESG ETFs and ETPs Listed Globally Reached a Record of US$246
Billion at the End of Q1 2021, ETFIGI.COM (Apr. 28, 2021), https://etfgi.com
/news/press-releases/2021/04/etfgi-reports-assets-invested-esg-etfs-and-etps
-listed-globally-reached [https://perma.cc/4NRL-WQ53].
78 See Andrews & Sheth, supra note 40; see also ESG ETF Assets Surge
Three-Fold in Record-Setting 2020 for ETFs, TRACKINSIGHT (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.trackinsight.com/news/esg-etf-assets-surge-three-fold-record-set
ting-2020-etfs/ [https://perma.cc/X3TH-C4MW].
79 See Mia Kwok, Spot the Difference. Does ESG Matter in ETFs?, LIVEWIRE MKTS. (June 15, 2021), https://www.livewiremarkets.com/wires/spot-the
-difference-does-esg-matter-in-etfs [https://perma.cc/J2BT-SBUD].
80 Gordon, supra note 66.
81 Eckett, supra note 69.
82 See 2021 Global ETF Investor Survey, BROWN BROS. HARRIMAN (Mar. 8,
2021), https://www.bbh.com/us/en/insights/investor-services-insights/2021-glo
bal-etf-survey.html [https://perma.cc/FG5R-CBPX] (“[The survey] captured responses from 382 ETF financial advisors (44%), institutional investors (30%),
77
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surveyed respondents, eighty-two percent indicated a desire to increase their portfolio allocation in ESG ETFs this coming year.83
It was revealed, however, that a “lack of consistent methodology and
framework” as well as ESG ETFs being “too expensive” were factors
that could prevent higher allocations from materializing.84
Financial advisor recommendations for ESG investment
products also heavily influence the direction of capital flows.85 ESG
investment products were recommended by sixty-one percent of
U.S. financial advisors according to a recent Broadridge Financial
Solutions Study, with seventy-one percent of female investment
advisors, and sixty-seven percent of advisors under the age of forty
recommending sustainable investment products.86 The survey
points to future growth in this sector, with eighty-one percent of
advisors looking to raise their client’s ESG exposures over the
next two years.87 According to data compiled by TrackInsight, ESG
ETFs grew by over 223% in 2020 and now have a record $189
billion AUM.88
U.S. financial market data aggregator Morningstar documented a post-2015 explosion in new ESG ETF launches in the
United States.89 Between 2005 and 2015, only twenty-seven ESG
ETFs were launched in the United States;90 however, between 2016
and the first half of 2020, there were seventy-five new ESG ETF
products distributed in U.S. markets.91 ESG demand has been so
strong that by the end of 2020 more than 250 existing European

and fund managers (26%) from the U.S., Europe, and Greater China to identify
key trends, highlight changing sentiment, and explore areas of innovation.”).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Max Chen, Financial Advisors Respond to Increased ESG Demand Among
Clients, ETF TRENDS (Apr. 18, 2021), https://www.etftrends.com/esg-channel/
financial-advisors-respond-to-increased-esg-demand-among-clients/ [https://
perma.cc/YY2G-XWVT].
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See ESG ETF Assets Surge Three-Fold in Record Setting 2020 for ETFs,
TRACKINSIGHT (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.trackinsight.com/en/article/esg-etf
-assets-surge-three-fold-record-setting-2020 [https://perma.cc/3NCQ-VAWG].
89 See Jon Hale, ESG Funds Setting a Record Pace for Launches in 2020,
MORNINGSTAR (June 23, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/989209/esg
-funds-setting-a-record-pace-for-launches-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/D8T7-GY4P].
90 Id.
91 Id.
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funds, including a large number of ETFs, had been “repurposed”
as sustainable investment products with fund managers introducing “ESG criteria to existing funds.”92
Available ESG ETFs include not only a wide array of equity
index products, but also bond and fixed income ETFs, driven by
an increased global demand for “green bonds.”93 Interest in ESG
ETFs extends beyond the United States, as this product segment
has also become the “top choice” for Chinese, Hong Kongese, and
Taiwanese institutional investors, fund managers and financial
advisors, even though there are “enduring doubts” about whether
they provide superior returns.94
II.ESG INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND COMPARISON COSTS
A. Comparability Is a Greater Problem Than Greenwashing in ETFs
The term “greenwashing” has become a popular way of
characterizing a phenomenon where firms and investment managers promote an ESG ethos (often focusing on climate change
or pro-environmental measures), yet their corporate actions and
portfolio holdings reveal unsustainable practices,95 or seemingly
non-ESG holdings like oil and gas companies.96 Given the rise in

92 See Elena Losavio, ESG Demand Prompts More than 250 European Funds
to Change Tack, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e023
7f69-a8c8-4bfc-9ccc-c466fb11f401 [https://perma.cc/RD3J-93Z4].
93 Green bonds or loans often have “green ‘use of proceeds’” such that the
money raised in the bond issuance is “earmarked solely for environmentallyfocused projects.” See Andrew Willis, Green Bonds Go Mainstream, MORNINGSTAR
(June 8, 2021, 2:15 AM), https://www.morningstar.ca/ca/news/212846/green-bonds
-go-mainstream.aspx [https://perma.cc/YZ79-DS8K] (quoting Steve Hawkins,
CEO of Horizons ETFs).
94 See Echo Huang, Chinese Institutions Put ESG ETFs on Most-Wanted List,
FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7b4a3167-e74e-4565-a
3ca-32cdcc2f147e [https://perma.cc/YLY6-VEKQ].
95 See Hao Liang et al., Greenwashing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON COR. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/17/green
washing/ [https://perma.cc/J68P-JAQV].
96 Akane Otani, ESG Funds Enjoy Record Inflows, Still Back Big Oil and Gas,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-esg-funds
-are-all-still-invested-in-oil-and-gas-companies-11573468200 [https://perma.cc
/QP89-H2U9]; Claire Ballentine, Big Oil Is Boosting ETF Returns and ESG
Funds Are No Exception, BNN BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.bnn
bloomberg.ca/big-oil-is-boosting-etf-returns-and-esg-funds-are-no-exception-1
.1597472 [https://perma.cc/F6P9-VMAM].
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investor demand for ESG and sustainable investment products,
a potential conflict of interest exists where asset managers could
publicly signal pro-sustainability principles (like those articulated
in the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment97)
to drive capital flows, yet fail to follow through on their actions,
or—even worse—engage in unsustainable practices or undesirable holdings.98
A scan of recent headlines suggests greenwashing is a major
99
issue. The underlying concern with greenwashing is deception—firms or asset managers endorse sustainability principles
to attract capital, but once procured, abandon ESG principles in
favor of performance.100 Yet, as this Article will show, the details
are important. First, ESG ETFs are not a binary “ESG or not
ESG,”101 and the term “greenwashing” adds little for investors in
navigating fund structures that incorporate some ESG elements
yet in widely disparate ways.102
There is little evidence that greenwashing is pervasive in
asset management or ETFs.103 Rather, research by Morningstar on

See What Are the Principles for Responsible Investment?, U.N. PRINCIPLES
RESPONSIBLE INV., https://www.unpri.org/pri/what-are-the-principles-for
-responsible-investment [https://perma.cc/E9PP-Z2GZ].
98 See Liang et al., supra note 95.
99 See Sustainable Finance Is Rife with Greenwash. Time for More Disclosure,
ECONOMIST (May 22, 2021), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/05/22
/sustainable-finance-is-rife-with-greenwash-time-for-more-disclosure [https://
perma.cc/UR44-8N2C]; Felicity Spors, How to Spot Greenwashing—and How
to Stop It, WORLD ECON. F. (May 20, 2021), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021
/05/how-spot-greenwashing/ [https://perma.cc/82GW-U84U]; Pedro Gonçalves,
Greenwashing Tops Investors’ Concerns around ESG, INV. WEEK (May 24, 2021),
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/news/4031729/greenwashing-tops-investors
-concerns-esg [https://perma.cc/RZ93-Q3LP]; James Langton, Regulators Target
“Greenwashed” Products, INV. EXEC. (May 17, 2021, 12:15 AM), https://www
.investmentexecutive.com/newspaper_/news-newspaper/regulators-target-green
washed-products/? [https://perma.cc/L87K-LEUA].
100 See Liang et al., supra note 95.
101 See Todd Cipperman, ESG or Not ESG? For the SEC, That Is the Question,
FIN. ADVISOR (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/esg-or-not-esg--for
-the-sec--that-is-the-question-61461.html [https://perma.cc/6CNB-PG6E].
102 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 21, 33 (listing several ESG
elements and later describing various investor strategies).
103 Shruti Medha & Natalie Koh, Do Fears of Greenwashing Outweigh the
Evidence?, ASIANINVESTOR (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.asianinvestor.net/arti
cle/do-fears-of-greenwashing-outweigh-the-evidence/472294 [https://perma.cc
/5T5N-Y87L].
97
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how well ESG funds (including both open-ended funds and ETFs)
are adhering to a sustainability mandate shows that “most sustainable equity funds do appear to be walking the walk” in terms of
at least some element of ESG integration and using proxy voting
power to support ESG shareholder resolutions more frequently
than non-ESG oriented funds.104 The challenge is distinguishing
funds without having to rely on private market information aggregators and assessment metrics.105 Related scholarly work confirms this analysis that for the most part “investors get the ESG
that they pay for.”106
Second, while greenwashing may be a legitimate concern
for actively managed mutual funds,107 it is less of a worry for
ETFs.108 ETF issuers are less likely to use greenwashing to chase
investor capital flows due to a variety of factors, including the
passive nature of most ETF indexes,109 their composition, design,
and tracking methodologies,110 and the lower-fee format of ETFs
over open-ended mutual funds.111 ETFs are increasingly being

Hale, Sustainable Equity, supra note 22 (The research report indicated,
however, that it was “less likely to find that the portfolio avoids fossil fuels,
although it’s reasonable to expect a somewhat lower carbon footprint than you
would get with a conventional fund.”).
105 Id. (the study cites the Morningstar Sustainability Rating and the Morningstar Portfolio Carbon Metrics as examples).
106 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 2004; see also id. at 1926 (discussing how “high-fee, niche funds have more ESG differentiated holdings
and voting patterns”).
Our review of the 2018 and 2019 voting records disclosed by
funds in each of our three sample groups on ESG-related shareholder proposals generated results broadly aligned with our
sense that investors get the ESG they are willing to pay for.
Funds offered by large, generalist fund complexes were the only
ones to consistently clash with ESG expectations.
Id. at 1958.
107 See Huw Jones, UK Watchdog Says Some Asset Managers Fail to Back up
Green Label on Investment Products, REUTERS (May 19, 2021, 12:53 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-watchdog-says-some-asset-managers-fail-back
-up-green-label-investment-2021-05-19/ [https://perma.cc/XX3N-5FZK].
108 See Jackson, supra note 5.
109 See Clements, Too Interconnected, supra note 3, at 772, 788–89.
110 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 131–34,
139–41.
111 See Why Are ETFs So Cheap?, ETF.COM (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.etf
.com/etf-education-center/etf-basics/why-are-etfs-so-cheap
[https://perma.cc
104
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viewed as a lower-cost, more-liquid managed asset alternative to
mutual funds,112 both of which are major factors in the recent
trend of mutual funds converting to the ETF structure.113
ETFs are easily accessible,114 and there are many comparable products across the universe of ETF varieties.115 An ETF
issuer who actually deceives through greenwashing could be met
with swift product switching by investors, and create an investor
herd that spreads to other internal product segments of an ETF
issuer, and is exacerbated if the media also detects deceptive behavior.116 It may also attract the scorn of institutional clients
and the “wrath of the regulators.”117 Thus, the possibility of reputational harm to ETF issuers from greenwashing serves as an
ever-present Sword of Damocles in the hyper-competitive world
of ETF fee pricing.118

/URG8-CGW5]; Stoyan Bojinov, Why Are ETFs So Much Cheaper than Mutual
Funds?, ETF DATABASE (June 24, 2015), https://etfdb.com/etf-education/etfs-vs
-mutual-funds-why-etfs-are-cheaper/ [https://perma.cc/4JRQ-5K9F].
112 See Adam Levy, ETF v. Mutual Fund: Similarities and Differences, MOTLEY
FOOL (Sept. 3, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/how-to-invest
/etfs/etf-vs-mutual-fund/ [https://perma.cc/QN69-MA8C].
113 See Claire Ballentine, If Your Mutual Fund Becomes an ETF, Here’s
Why, BLOOMBERG WEALTH (Apr. 1, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2021-04-01/if-your-mutual-fund-becomes-an-etf-here-s-why
-quicktake [https://perma.cc/GM6C-Y6LF].
114 See Lizzy Gurdus, The SEC Says It’s Making ETFs More Accessible—
Here’s What That Could Mean for Investors, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2019, 11:56 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/02/the-sec-says-its-making-etfs-more-accessible
what-that-could-mean.html [https://perma.cc/5KLK-T6FC].
115 It was reported that by the end of 2020 the total number of global ETFs had
grown to 7,602. See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, Number of ETFs Globally 2003–2020,
STATISTA (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/278249/global-num
ber-of-etfs/ [https://perma.cc/4CQ9-U67P].
116 See Cipperman, supra note 101 (“Ultimately, investors themselves will
enforce compliant behavior in this regard, by avoiding those funds and managers that fail to live up to their stated ESG objectives. This market discipline,
along with the SEC’s expected focus on ESG enforcement, and the challenges of
defining sustainable investing, make it essential for fund managers and their compliance teams to take immediate action to avoid future ESG-related missteps.”)
117 See id.
118 See Max Chen, In a Fund Industry Fee War, ETF Investors Win, ETF
TRENDS (June 9, 2020), https://www.etftrends.com/in-fund-industry-fee-war-etf-in
vestors-win/ [https://perma.cc/5LJ4-9556]; Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index
Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2054–55 (2019).
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As noted in prior scholarship, the vast proliferation of available ETFs, combined with broad discretion in operational, management, marketing, and financial practices of ETF issuers has
made this popular product nearly impossible to effectively compare side-by-side.119 The increasingly trendy ESG ETF variety is
illustrative of the concern of product comparability,120 and these
products have unique information acquisition and synthesis costs
and comparative complexities worthy of heightened regulatory scrutiny which has been identified in other recent studies.121 The
current state of global regulation over ESG ETFs does not help
to decrease the comparative complexities that investors face.122
B. Information Acquisition Costs and Comparative Complexity
The sheer number of products that have taken on a “socially responsible” description is staggering,123 and it is unrealistic to think that investors, or even advisors for that matter, can
easily compare or distinguish these products.124 In 2019, the
Institute for International Finance noted that the “sheer proliferation” of ESG-related terminology is leading to investor confusion.125 As the universe of available ESG ETF products, and the
diversity of terms relating to sustainable investing, continues to
grow, investors face a formidable task in accurately comparing
products side-by-side.126 The SEC has acknowledged this problem,127 and later in this Article direct steps will be presented to
aid investor comparability.128

See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 128.
120 See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 7, at 1975–76.
121 See id., at 1940–45.
122 See Andrews & Sheth, supra note 40.
123 See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 115.
124 Popular ETF data aggregator website ETF.com lists 141 “socially responsible” ETFs. See Socially Responsible ETF Overview, ETF.COM, https://www.etf
.com/channels/socially-responsible [https://perma.cc/2UGS-9FT6].
125 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., IIF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP
REPORT, THE CASE FOR SIMPLIFYING SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT TERMINOLOGY
1 (Oct. 2019) [hereinafter IIF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE].
126 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 127–29.
127 See SEC INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION FROM THE INVESTORAS-OWNER SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE RELATING
TO ESG DISCLOSURE 1 (May 14, 2020) [hereinafter SEC RECOMMENDATION].
128 See infra Part III.
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Recently published scholarship highlights how industry practices of ETF issuers, including discretionary operational, management, marketing, and financial practices, “undermined” the ability
of investors to make accurate side-by-side product comparisons,
and this problem is compounded by ineffective disclosures and
investor behavioral tenancies.129 The challenges encountered when
attempting to accurately compare ESG ETFs strongly advance
contentions in prior scholarship, resulting in tremendous ex
ante information acquisition, synthesis, and “processing” costs
for ETF investors.130
An ETF investor, who desires exposure to ESG oriented
products, faces a formidable task in interpreting and synthesizing
ESG metrics and attempting to accurately compare such products
side-by-side.131 Popular ETF information aggregator sites do
little to ease this comparative burden since they add diverse ESG
sub-rating categories, some of which are also behind paywalls.132

See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 128–29; see
also id. at 161–62 (“Despite influential works asserting ‘rational expectations’
of investors and ‘efficient markets,’ a variety of studies counter that investors
are prone to error, limited in their rational functioning, and subject to a wide
range of decision-making biases and cognitive limitations when processing
information. Studies of this nature look to test ‘judgmental processes’ when
investors assess information and make decisions. Mandated securities disclosure serves many worthy public policy goals. Yet the usefulness to investors
of such disclosure is (in part) contingent on their ability to accurately organize, synthesize, and utilize information to make better decisions.”).
130 Id. at 171 (“Information disclosure can increase competition, improve
product quality, alter consumer behavior, and aid in better decision making if
it is used correctly. Information will only be used correctly if it is effectively
processed .... Not all information that is available will be readily processible,
and information will be more effectively processed if it is delivered with adequate context.”).
131 See Andrews & Sheth, supra note 40.
132 See ETG Screener, ETFSTREAM.COM, https://www.etfstream.com/etf
-screener/ [https://perma.cc/K5AU-8BLF] (ETF Stream uses an ESG scoring
metric called “Basket-Weighted ESG Score” in its assessment mechanism.).
While in the screener ETF Stream states the following concerning their scoring metric system, Arabesque defines this score, in a single security, “as a
sector specific analysis of each company’s performance on financially material
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.” Arabesque S-Ray Sustainability Scores, FACTSET (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.factset.com/market
place/catalog/product/arabesque-s-rayr-score-layer [https://perma.cc/R27Q-FH6X].
This can be used to “identify companies ... that are more likely to outperform
129
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For example, in addition to providing an MSCI ESG rating of
greater than zero for 1,889 separate funds, at the time of writing,
ETF Database also published bespoke subcategory ratings including “ESG Score Peer Percentile,” “ESG Score Global Percentile,”
“Carbon Intensity,” “SRI Exclusion Criteria,” and “Sustainable
Impact Solutions.”133
Peer aggregator site ETF.com recently listed 1,941 ETFs
with an MSCI ESG rating above zero, with distinct ESG subcategory ratings including “ESG Rating,” “Score Peer Rank,” “Score
Global Rank,” “Carbon Intensity,” “Sustainable Impact Exposure,” and “SRI Screening Criteria Exposure.”134 Having such an
ex ante informational burden to navigate, without a standardized regulatory solution, is not in the best interests of investor
protection.135 Not only do ETF managers use diverse and discretionary methods,136 research has revealed that commercial ESG
rating agencies also disagree on the definition of ESG, and the
characteristics, attributes, and standards associated with each
of the “E[nvironmental],” “S[ocial],” and “G[overnance]” subcomponents.137 In an ETF global data survey by Brown Brothers
Harriman, respondents were canvassed “how” they evaluated ESG
ETFs, and the responses were diverse and inconsistent; and not
a single suggested individual factor was chosen by a majority of
survey participants.138 There have been recent industry attempts to
synthesize, and bring greater transparency, to the underlying
selection process driving asset manager ESG investments. Such

over the long run.” Id. (Consult the Arabesque S-Rat methodology for more
details.) The aggregator site’s screener also includes individual “E,” “S,” and
“G” scores for respective ETFs, as well as stats for “problematic” industries
such as gaming, defense, tobacco, oil, coal, adult industries, and stem cells. Id.
133 See Screener, ETFDB.COM, https://etfdb.com/screener/ [https://perma.cc
/45KU-DSJ2].
134 See ETF Finder, ETF.COM, https://www.etf.com/etfanalytics/etf-finder
[https://perma.cc/5KU8-JNSX].
135 See SEC RECOMMENDATION, supra note 127, at 1.
136 See id at 4.
137 See Monica Billio et al., Inside the ESG Ratings: (Dis)Agreement and
Performance, 28 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T MGMT. 1426, 1427 (2021).
138 See 2021 Global ETF Investor Survey, supra note 82 (The sampled participants were provided with the evaluation factors, “third-party ratings,” “[i]nhouse/proprietary ESG ratings criteria,” “[r]eview company statements/reports for
underlying holdings,” and “[b]rand recognition of ETF manager.”).
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attempts include those of the working group organized by the
Investment Company Institute,139 and advocacy efforts by the
Institute of International Finance to simplify ESG investment
terminology.140 Yet investors are largely left to their own devices
to navigate and distinguish these increasingly complex, diverse,
and discretionary industry taxonomies and practices.141
As noted in prior scholarship, mega-ETF issuers like BlackRock stand to materially benefit from an environment of informational complexity, and ex ante information acquisition costs
faced by ETF investors, because of a behavioral principle known
as “overreliance on salience” (also known as the “quality heuristic”) where larger firms are interpreted as providing better and
higher-quality products given their size and public profile.142 A

See INV. CO. INST., FUNDS’ USE OF ESG INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABLE
INVESTING STRATEGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 10 (July 2020) (working group
members include Ariel Investments, LLC; BlackRock, Inc.; Capital Research
and Management Company; Columbia Threadneedle Investments; Dimensional
Fund Advisors; Eaton Vance Corp.; Fidelity Investments; J.P. Morgan Asset
Management; Karla Rabusch, Lord Abbett Funds; Neuberger Berman; New
York Life Investment Management LLC; Nuveen; T. Rowe Price; Vanguard;
Voya Investment Management).
140 See IIF Proposes Alignment Around Fewer, Simpler Sustainable Investment
Terms to Enhance Transparency and Bolster Confidence in the Integrity of the
Market, INST. INT’L FIN. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.iif.com/Press/View/ID
/3637/IIF-Proposes-Alignment-Around-Fewer-Simpler-Sustainable-Investment
-Terms-to-Enhance-Transparency-and-Bolster-Confidence-in-the-Integrity-of
-the-Market [https://perma.cc/AXT3-L5E4].
141 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 139, at 2, 8 (the aforementioned working
group identifies a “Broad Spectrum of ESG-Related Investing Strategies” and
both qualitative and quantitative practices utilized by asset managers including self-selected integration of ESG factors into investment decisions, both
exclusionary and inclusionary practices, and “impact” factor analysis).
142 Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 170 (“[W]hen
ETF investors attempt to compare products, the potential exists for a disproportionate windfall in investment assets to flow to the largest ETF firms because
of a concept called ‘overreliance on salience.’ This could create a bias for ‘brand
names’ as ‘perceptions of quality based on the brand’s profile,’ rather than investors looking into the specific details and factors associated with a particular fund. Salience could also be generated by the steady media coverage of the
largest ETF firms, particularly BlackRock, in light of its growing influence
within the U.S. government in facilitating the coronavirus stimulus.”); see ONT.
SEC. COMM’N, BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS KEY CONCEPTS, APPLICATIONS AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 33 (Mar. 29, 2017).
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similar phenomenon has been observed with initial public offering performance and the “reputation” of the investment bank
underwriting the offering.143 In BlackRock’s case, perception bias
is aided by the government’s previous high-profile reliance on the
asset manager’s expertise to navigate both the 2008 global financial and 2020 coronavirus financial crises.144
BlackRock is positioning itself to be the world’s perceived
leader in ESG investing given CEO Larry Fink’s consistent message
of a need for sustainability,145 the firm’s increasing ESG-integration media footprint,146 and expanding menu of ESG ETFs.147 As
such, an investor overwhelmed by choice in the ESG ETF universe
could easily defer to a BlackRock product because they perceive
them to be the best, given the firm’s size and public influence,148
without really digging into the ways that BlackRock’s products
differ from other ESG choices.
C. Commercial ESG Index Providers and ETF Issuer Bespoke
ESG Indices
Navigating the ESG ETF universe is also complexified by the
nature of indexing itself.149 The rise of ESG investment demand,
increased capital flows and the proliferation of available ETFs has
collaterally given rise to an explosion in ETF indices, including
from conventional commercial index provider powerhouses MSCI,

Richard B. Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and
Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1056–62 (1990).
144 See Gillian Tett, Why the US Federal Reserve Turned Again to BlackRock
for Help, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f3ea07b0-6f
5e-11ea-89df-41bea055720b [https://perma.cc/2V98-YEVH]; Pedro Nicolaci da
Costa, A Glaring New Conflict of Interest Undermines Public Trust in Federal
Reserve, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020, 12:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/pedrodacosta/2020/04/20/a-glaring-new-conflict-of-interest-undermines-public
-trust-in-federal-reserve/?sh=16c0b96e135d [https://perma.cc/BZY5-ESPA].
145 See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2021 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK (2021),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/SN4L-YR7W].
146 See ESG Integration, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/ch/individual
/en/themes/sustainable-investing/esg-integration [https://perma.cc/KQ3Q-KAW3].
147 See Sustainable Investing, ISHARES BY BLACKROCK, https://www.ishares
.com/us/strategies/sustainable-investing [https://perma.cc/M8BX-EMSB].
148 See Tett, supra note 144.
149 See Mooney, supra note 77.
143
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FTSE, and S&P.150 Other major ESG index providers include
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, and Vigeo Eiris.151 Each of these
commercial index providers uses a different “secret sauce” in constituting ESG tracking measures.152 Interestingly, however, some
commercial sustainability indices have been shown to score
poorly in ESG metrics from external ETF sustainability data
provider TrackInsight.153
Recent research has shown that many ETFs track a “bespoke” index (often designed by an affiliate of the asset manager)—
implying a component of active management in a seemingly passive
vehicle.154 A scan of the ever expanding menu of available passive
ESG ETF offerings listed through commercial aggregator sites reveal many funds which do not use a commercial index provider like
MSCI or FTSE but rather design a unique underlying index around
a particular ESG theme.155 The widening array of bespoke ESG
indices constructed by ETF issuers complexify the already difficult to navigate comparable landscape of product selection.156
III.HOW ESG ETF COMPARATIVE OPACITY HARMS INVESTORS
A. It’s ESG, But Not Exactly What I Thought I Purchased
Sustainability is big business for Wall Street since ESG
varieties are on average forty-three percent more expensive than

Id. (highlighting popular sustainability indices including the MSCI
USA Extended ESG Focus Index, the MSCI Emerging Markets Extended ESG
Focus Index, the FTSE US All Cap Choice Index, the S&P 500 ESG Total
Return Net Index, the S&P Global Clean Energy Index, and the MAC Global
Solar Energy Index).
151 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 19.
152 See Mooney, supra note 77 (MSCI uses ten themes and thirty-seven
factors, FTSI uses fourteen themes, and S&P uses twenty-three criteria).
153 See id.
154 See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795, 830–31 (2019).
155 See Socially Responsible ETF Overview, supra note 124 (which includes,
among many other examples, such bespoke ETF ESG underlying indices as
the BlackRock iShares Global Clean Energy ETF, the Vanguard ESG U.S. Stock
ETF, the Invesco Solar ETF, and the Nuveen ESG Large-Cap Value ETF); ETF
Quickrank, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/etfs/screener-rank [https://
perma.cc/7FDG-2JV3] (which includes, among many other examples, such bespoke ETF ESG underlying indices as the Clearbridge All Cap Growth ESG ETF,
the Ecofin Global Water ESG Fund, and the WisdomTree U.S. ESG Fund).
156 See Robertson, supra note 154, at 830–31.
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regular ETFs.157 But, when you investigate ESG ETFs, you do not
find blatant greenwashing; rather, you find subtle distinctions in
legitimate ESG mandates that both impair easy investor comparison and create a scenario where investors may not realize
what they are getting.158 For example, some ETF issuers may enact “exclusionary” policies for certain sectors (like tobacco) but still
invest in oil and gas companies because they are “best in class.”159 A
recent report revealed that of the top twenty-nine ETF managers
(with combined assets under management of over $41 trillion),
only a quarter of their products had coal-exclusion policies.160
A core contention of this Article is that ESG integration is
a matter of degree and discretion, not necessarily one of deception (i.e., greenwashed).161 For example, some ETFs might look
to avoid fossil fuels altogether, while others look to reduce carbon exposure risk.162 A recent Morningstar research report noted
that from a wide cross-analysis of sustainable funds, less than
one-third avoided investing in fossil fuels.163 On the question of
fossil fuel exposure, some ETFs could easily confuse investors, such
as the three State Street “Fossil Fuel Reserves Free” variety of
ETF which still has fossil fuel exposure despite the name.164

See Michael Wursthorn, Tidal Wave of ESG Funds Brings Profits to
Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/tidal-wave-of-esg-funds-brings-profit-to-wall-street-11615887004 [https://perma
.cc/7ZGF-CC6G] (“The environmental, social, and governance funds’ average
fee was 0.2% at the end of last year, while standard ETFs that invest in U.S. largecap stocks had a 0.14% fee on average, according to data from FactSet.”).
158 See Robertson, supra note 154, at 830–31.
159 See Christoph Biehl & Jill Atkins, Responsible Investment in the United
Kingdom, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RESPONSIBLE INV. 355, 357 (Tessa
Hebb et al. eds., 2016).
160 Chris Flood, ETFs Present ‘Recipe for Climate Chaos’ Study Claims,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/8ee2ac80-9025-4dbb-b
d1c-b33a86e87549 [https://perma.cc/44BV-VEHU].
161 See supra Part II.
162 See Margaret Giles, Not All Sustainable Funds are Equally Sustainable,
MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1033389
/not-all-sustainable-funds-are-equally-sustainable [https://perma.cc/4MQH-BLLW].
163 See Hale, Sustainable Equity, supra note 22.
164 Id. (“Investors should be aware of differences in how funds define being
fossil-fuel-free. For example, three State Street ETFs use the term ‘Fossil
Fuel Reserves Free’ in their names. They exclude companies that own ‘proved
157
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The current regulatory framework favors ETF issuers over
ETF investors because it is not easy to compare funds side by
side.165 The range of approaches for fulfilling an ESG mandate are
so wide that investors are forced to rely on private market solutions
like “sustainability ratings” offered by information intermediators
like Morningstar.166 There are a wide number of ESG ratings providers, including MSCI, Bloomberg, RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics,
as well as traditional ratings agencies like Moody’s, S&P and Fitch
that also provide ESG rating services.167 These ratings services
calculate ESG scoring assessments based on regulatory disclosures
utilizing wide-ranging, and proprietary, quantitative assessment
practices.168 Asset managers like ETF issuers routinely rely on
these ratings providers to assess the sustainable qualities of portfolio companies.169
The problem is that ESG ratings themselves vary considerably depending on the rating provider that is consulted.170 An
investigation conducted by researchers at the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that ESG
scores vary much more widely than the credit scores of individual corporate issuers.171 As such, it’s highly questionable whether
a market solution will remedy the current trend toward discretion and resulting complexity for investors.172 Without a clear,
consistent, and standardized ESG scoring and assessment regulatory framework, investors will continue to have difficulty performing accurate product comparisons.173

and probable coal, oil, and/or natural gas reserves used for energy purposes’
but still have overall fossil-fuel exposure ranging from 4.3% to 7.4%.”).
165 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 169–70.
166 Giles, supra note 162.
167 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 19.
168 Id. at 21–22.
169 Id. at 20.
170 Id. at 3 (“The key findings of our analysis illustrate that ESG ratings
vary strongly depending on the provider chosen, which can occur for a number of
reasons, such as different frameworks, measures, key indicators and metrics,
data use, qualitative judgement, and weighting of subcategories.”).
171 Id. at 29.
172 Id. at 22–23.
173 Id.
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B. Evaluating Financial Performance and Broad Market
Correlation
Given the variability of ESG scoring metrics, ratings and
scoring systems, the subjectivity in the investment decision-making
process for investment managers (and the diversity of explanations of these processes, and how ESG objectives are met in required disclosure documents), it is very difficult for an investor
to efficiently allocate capital in this sector.174 It is also very difficult for investors to pursue “ESG outcomes that might require a
trade-off in financial performance.”175 Additionally, the common
inclusion of tech stocks in ESG ETFs increase the likelihood of
correlation between thematic ESG funds and broad market indices
like the S&P 500.176
A recent Bloomberg opinion piece reported that the Vanguard ESG Fund has a nearly identical correlation with BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (a higher correlation than most
indices even have to their underlying benchmarks), despite the
former having a significantly higher expense ratio.177 The Vanguard ESG Fund isn’t idiosyncratic in its broad index mirroring,
and this is largely due to the inclusion of many tech companies
(which often score highly in the “E” and “G” elements of sustainable
investing) in ESG ETFs. This is particularly the case with several
ETFs in Europe which offer exposure to the MSCI USA ESG Universal Screened Index but include tech megafirms like Amazon,
Google, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft in their top holdings.178

See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 162.
175 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 3; see also id. at 7–8.
176 See Aaron Brown, Many ESG Funds Are Just Expensive S&P 500 Indexers, BLOOMBERG OP. (May 7, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/opinion/articles/2021-05-07/many-esg-funds-are-just-expensive-s-p-500-index
ers [https://perma.cc/VL63-H3G5].
177 Id. (“The other ESG funds charge similar outrageous fees for tiny adjustments to the S&P 500. FlexShares charges 0.32%, which works out to 16% on
the active portion of its portfolio. Conscious Companies charges 0.43%, but has a
lower S&P 500 correlation, so is a relative bargain at only 11% for its active
portion. SPDR charges 0.20%, or 18% on the active portion. ESG Aware is the
second cheapest on raw fees at 0.15%, but its sky-high correlation of performance
with the S&P 500 means you’re paying more than 20% on the active share.”).
178 See Tom Eckett, Are Broad-Based ESG ETFs Closet Trackers?, ETF
STREAM (May 11, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/features/are-broad-based
-esg-etfs-closet-trackers/ [https://perma.cc/W2L2-HHAN].
174
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One portfolio manager recently called many ESG ETFs
“just expensive S&P 500 indexers,” and recommended investing
in the actual index and donating the amount saved on excess
expenses to charity.179 Independent of an investor’s motivation
for holding an ESG ETF in the first place,180 a “more expensive”
S&P index ETF may just be a wealth transfer from investors to
asset managers, rather than a truly impactful sustainable investment.181 The recommendations in Part IV will help ESG investors clearly distinguish ESG-named funds from more generic
passive index fund varieties with lower comparison and information acquisition costs.182
C. Is it E, S, or G? Just Trust Us ... We’re ESG!
Another legitimate critique of the ESG investing space is
that the nomenclature tries to take on too much at the same
time.183 Each of the three segments of ESG are inherently different—and very subjective.184 ETFs that attempt all at once to
integrate environmental and social measures, while aligning sustainable governance practices, will inevitably face internal conflicts.185 For example, Tenecent is a popular “E” holding, given
its low carbon footprint, but scores poorly in “S” and “G” as a
result of its history of data privacy violations and data sharing
with the Chinese Communist Party and connection to censoring
and tracking of Uyghur Muslims.186

See Brown, supra note 176.
180 See id. Some of the common justifications for ESG investing including a
subjective belief that sustainable enterprises will generate better long run
returns, a desire to reduce the cost of capital for “good” companies and increase
finance costs for “bad,” and a “signal” mechanism as a virtuous investor. See id.
181 See id.
182 See infra Part IV; see also Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra
note 9, at 130.
183 See Jason Capul, ESG ETFs Can Be More Subjective than Investors Realize, SEEKING ALPHA (May 4, 2021, 8:07 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/news
/3690243-esg-etfs-can-be-more-subjective-than-investors-may-realize [https://
perma.cc/762W-NLJP].
184 Id.
185 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 36.
186 Jamie Gordon, Is It Possible to Reconcile China and ESG?, ETF STREAM
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/features/is-it-possible-to-reconcile
179
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Of the three subcomponents of ESG, the “S” (or social) element is particularly problematic to both apply187 and comparatively
interpret.188 As part of its “Principles for Responsible Investment”
(PRI) framework, the United Nations suggests that the “social”
component of ESG focuses on factors such as labor and community
relations, consumer rights, supply chain management, product
safety, and health and safety.189 ETFs will often use technology
stocks as performance enhancers,190 which may have good “E”
metrics but due to data privacy and worker standards are deficient on the “S.”191 China is an emerging concern in the ESG
ETF universe given the country’s terrible ESG record.192
Interestingly, BlackRock has been shown to overweight
itself in ESG ETF financial portfolio allocations, aligned with a
belief in its own perceived “virtuous” investment ethos.193 These

-china-and-esg/ [https://perma.cc/L8CC-3XFP] (“According to Dutch hacker
Victor Gevers, data on the conversations, payments and travel habits of millions of Uyghur Muslims were passed onto Chinese police and used to censor
and track Uyghurs both within the country and overseas.”).
187 See U.N. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE
COVID-19 RECOVERY AND REFORM 15 (July 6, 2020); David Wood, What do we
mean by the S in ESG: Society as a stakeholder in responsible investment, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RESPONSIBLE INV. 553, 555 (Tessa Hebb et al. eds.,
2016).
188 See Wood, supra note 187, at 555.
189 See U.N. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., INTEGRATED ANALYSIS:
HOW INVESTORS ARE ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE
FACTORS IN FUNDAMENTAL EQUITY VALUATION 44 (Feb. 2013).
190 See Patti Domm, Alphabet Was the Most Widely Held Stock for the Largest
ESG Funds. Here’s What Else They Own, CNBC (May 18, 2021, 8:27 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/05/18/alphabet-was-the-most-widely-held-stock-for-the
-largest-esg-funds.html [https://perma.cc/FC4M-BGHL].
191 Wursthorn, supra note 157.
192 Steve Johnson, China’s ESG Ratings Tarnish Its Allure for Sustainable
Investors, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/fd835576-59fd-4b
b6-93e7-cc30f254a358 [https://perma.cc/8DFD-MNUD]; Gordon, supra note 186.
193 Brown, supra note 176 (“BlackRock Inc. thinks it’s more virtuous than
the average S&P 500 company, so in its own ESG fund the company accounts
for a 0.53 percent weighting, compared with a weighting of 0.33 percent as a
member of the S&P 500. The money manager is one of the largest percentage
overweights in the fund. But it’s not the financial industry in general that’s
virtuous; Blackrock underweights competitors Charles Schwab Corp., Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan
Chase & Co. Wells Fargo & Co. has a zero weighting. Are BlackRock’s analysts
and managers the people you want to trust to reflect your ESG opinions?”).
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asset managers are not reliable “information intermediaries”194
from the perspective of their synthesizing ESG data to make it
ascertainable and useable in investment making decisions by
investors.195 Rather each asset manager, as an intermediary, is
competing for the same pool of money in a zero sum game of investment capital flow capture, using subject mechanisms and
processes to construct ETF indices or make discretionary decisions in active management style ETF structures.196
The five largest ETF issuers in the United States (by way
of assets under management (AUM)) present ESG information on
their own websites in a way that confirms this Article’s analysis—
that ESG is being incorporated into funds, but in an entirely
opaque way that favors ETF issuers over investors.197 BlackRock,
the world’s largest ETF issuer,198 incorporates an easy to navigate
product screener function,199 and categorized data, including descriptive commentary, under both a “sustainable characteristics,”
and “business involvement” heading for each fund.200 BlackRock
also provides a “sustainable investing” educational resource under
“investment themes” which outlines their approach to sustainable investing.201
Similarly, the second largest ETF issuer by AUM, Van202
guard
has general educational content on ESG investing,203

See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational Intermediation, 1
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 58, 58 (2011).
195 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 157.
196 See id. at 159–60.
197 See id. at 183.
198 Mark Kolakowski, Who Are the ETF Giants?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/who-are-the-etf-giants4691723 [https://perma
.cc/9WH7-MUTE].
199 See Products, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore
/en/products/product-list#!type=ishares&style=All&view=perfNav [https://perma
.cc/N5VH-SHL4].
200 See iShares Core S&P 500 ETF, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock
.com/americas-offshore/en/products/239726/ishares-core-sp-500-etf [https://perma
.cc/4SAQ-KY6U] (The “business involvement” heading outlines the percentage of
the fund that in invested in potentially controversial or non-ESG industries.).
201 See Sustainable Investing, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/hk
/en/investment-ideas/sustainable-investing [https://perma.cc/HD6G-XXZK].
202 See Kolakowski, supra note 198.
203 See ESG Investing, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/invest
ing/esg/ [https://perma.cc/NRJ8-T6WQ].
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but provides limited fund specific ESG data for their available ESGthemed funds.204 Neither ETF issuer has uniformity in their
information presentation style, passing on the synthesis burden
to individual investors.205 Rounding out the top five, State Street,206
and Charles Schwab207 respectively, provide general information
on their approach and goals relating to ESG and “socially responsible investing” in general, but with less fund specific ESG
informational content than BlackRock.208 Invesco, while having
an easy-to-navigate website, provides little ESG data at all.209
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the “way” that
information is presented is distinct, non-uniform, and nonstandardized.210 This compounds the informational synthesis
challenges created when attempting to compare funds side by
side, forcing investors to resort to private market aggregators
who also present information in a non-standardized way.211

See Vanguard ESG U.S. Stock ETF, VANGUARD, https://investor.van
guard.com/etf/profile/ESGV [https://perma.cc/Y2CT-93J9].
205 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 183–85; see
also id. at 184 (“ETF firms do not have market incentives to study the most
effective means of website presentation for investors, since they can be easily
copied by other firms. One scholar has called this a ‘collective action problem’
for investment managers to devise an ‘optimal layout’ on their own. The SEC
can remedy this problem, while enhancing comparability and democratizing
access, by standardizing website disclosure formats and filing ETF key data
in a structured and consistent format, then making it publicly available
through a central database or repository in an optimal structure determined
by the regulator that allows for ETF side-by-side comparison.”).
206 See ESG Overview, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com
/us/en/individual/mf/capabilities/esg/investment-solutions
[https://perma.cc
/LEG5-DFXG.
207 See Socially Responsible Investing, CHARLES SCHWAB, https://www.schwab
.com/socially-responsible-investing [https://perma.cc/4P3U-7AMT].
208 See iShares ESG Aware MSCI USA ETF, BLACKROCK, https://www.black
rock.com/us/individual/products/286007/ishares-esg-msci-usa-etf [https://perma
.cc/MPH7-RD6Q] (BlackRock displays a variety of ESG data under a “sustainable
characteristics” heading for their menu of funds including “MSCI ESG %
Coverage,” “MSCI Weighted Carbon Intensity,” and “Funds in Peer Group.”).
209 See Kristina Hooper, Markets look for a foothold to climb the ‘wall of worry’,
INVESCO (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.invesco.com/us/en/Individual-investor
.html [https://perma.cc/WC5S-MC2J].
210 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 128, 173,
197–98.
211 Id. at 128–29.
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The subjectivity in ESG determinations is even more pronounced in the increasingly expanding “active” ETF space—a “semitransparent” operating structure,212 that combines conventional
mutual fund proprietary portfolio inclusion decision-making strategies with the low fee, intra-day liquidity that has made ETFs such
a popular investment product.213 For example, Fidelity recently
launched two nontransparent actively managed ESG ETFs focusing on U.S. sustainability and women’s leadership, respectively.214 Such active ETF structures allow ETF managers to
divest certain companies and deviate from underlying indices
they are tracking if the manager considers it as ESG impactful.215 However, this style of fund management makes the “trust
us” sentiment even more pronounced as investors have very little
transparency (and no control) ex ante over the decision-making
process leading to ad hoc discretionary portfolio adjustments on
the basis of ESG determinations.216

Actively managed ETFs do not provide investors with holdings disclosure on a daily basis, but rather provide delayed disclosure of their full portfolio and a representative portfolio in order for ETF ecosystem participants to
perform operational arbitrage and maintain price stability between an ETF’s
underlying net asset value and the secondary trading price. See Ian Young,
Activity-Managed ESG ETFs Offer Diversification for Investors, ETF TRENDS
(June 11, 2021), https://www.etftrends.com/active-etf-channel/actively-managed
-esg-etfs-offer-diversification-for-investors/ [https://perma.cc/SCF7-9Q3B]; John
Coumarianos, Stage Set For Broader Array of ETFs, Especially Active Ones,
BARRON’S (Dec. 20, 2019, 4:25 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/stage-is
-set-for-a-broader-array-of-etfs-especially-active-ones-51576877127 [https://perma
.cc/WE26-XENW]; Lizzy Gurdus, ‘This could be the year’ for Active Management, Says NYSE Head of Exchange Traded Products, CNBC (May 30, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/30/nyse-etf-chief-talks-state-of-indus
try-as-assets-under-management-rise.html [https://perma.cc/9DG2-HCH5].
213 See Young, supra note 212; Aaron Neuwirth, Fidelity Launches New
Active ESG ETFs, FSST & FDWM, ETF DATABASE (June 16, 2021), https://
etfdb.com/news/2021/06/16/fidelity-launches-new-active-esg-etfs-fsst-fdwm/
[https://perma.cc/69QK-QE92].
214 See Simon Smith, Fidelity Unveils Two Actively Managed ESG ETFs,
ETF STRATEGY (June 17, 2021), https://www.etfstrategy.com/fidelity-unveils
-two-actively-managed-esg-etfs-fsst-fdwm-nyse-arca-38493/ [https://perma.cc
/V76M-XNBL].
215 See Young, supra note 212.
216 Id.
212

474 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:441
IV.HOW TO IMPROVE COMPARABILITY IN ESG ETFS
A. Step One: Justify ESG Name Usage in Specific ETF
Disclosures
The name of an investment product can have a significant
impact on the decision to purchase, and investors are “misled”
when a fund invests in a way that isn’t consistent with how it’s
named.217 Naming mischief in investment products extends beyond ESG products to fixed income and bond funds,218 factor and
thematic funds,219 and inverse and derivative based products.220
At the most surface level, without regulated naming conventions
for ESG varieties, ETF issuers can rebrand a fund without changing its underlying index composition.221 But as this Article has
shown, it’s the subtle details that are most important, since they
obscure investor comparisons.222
ESG investment products utilize a litany of terms such as
“socially responsible investing,” “sustainable,” “green,” “ethical,”
“impact,” and “governance” none of which are formally regulated
or standardized in the United States.223 Other terms, like “best in
class” imply a global or industry leader which may not be obvious
(or empirically verifiable).224 A lack of standardized terminology

CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., RE:FILE NO. S7-04-20 REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
ON FUND NAMES 1 (May 12, 2020) [hereinafter RE:FILE NO. S7-04-20].
218 See Huaizhi Chen et al., Don’t Take Their Word For It: The Misclassification of Bond Mutual Funds, 76 J. FIN. 1699–1700, 1716, 1727 (2021) (This
study shows a widespread problem of bond fund “misclassification” and suggests that over thirty-one percent of all bond mutual funds are misclassified
with “safer profiles” compared to their actual publicly disclosed holdings. This
results in both better Morningstar ratings and increased fund flows.).
219 Sloane Ortel et al., How to See the Hidden Risks of ETFs, CFA INST.
(Jan. 1, 2018), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2018/01/18/how-to-see-the
-hidden-risks-of-etfs/ [https://perma.cc/K79X-CJYD]; see George Athanassakos,
Why Investors Aren’t Getting True Value Stocks with Value ETFs, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/etfs
/article-why-investors-arent-getting-true-value-stocks-with-value-etfs/
[https://
perma.cc/XK49-PE9N].
220 Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 154–57, 189–90.
221 See Holger, supra note 59.
222 See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 151–52.
223 See SEC RECOMMENDATION, supra note 127, at 1 n.1.
224 Mark Burgess, CFA and Other Organizations Move to Fill Gap in ESG
Standards, ADVISORS EDGE (June 28, 2021, 12:31 PM), https://www.advisor
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creates the risk for investor confusion and investment advisor
conflicts.225 It is not sufficient to assume that investor advisors
will self-correct this problem.226 Recent reports show that despite
“ESG acceptance” among investors, many advisors themselves are
poorly informed on product discrepancies and responsible investing in general.227
On April 9, 2021, the SEC’s Division of Examinations issued
a Risk Alert called “Review of ESG Investing” that highlights many
of the challenges in this nascent trend,228 including an absence
of ESG internal decision-making policies and procedures;229 portfolio management actions that are “inconsistent” with ESG-related
public disclosures;230 inaccurate or false claims relating to ESG
products;231 and reliance on third parties to prepare ESG “composite scores” rather than a fund conducting its own internal
assessment of ESG suitability.232
While “risk alerts” are helpful, they are a short-term solution, and a consistent taxonomy for sustainable investing would
greatly enhance investor protection.233 One possible idea to consider is an “ecolabel” certification for ETF products, with sub-labels
for specific terminology, building on the EU ecolabel for financial
products currently being developed by the European Commission.234
Industry led ESG fund certifications, voluntary disclosure
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standards, and ESG screening tools are also being developed by
the CFA Institute.235
In March 2020, the SEC sought public comment on the
current effectiveness of Rule 35d-1 under the Investment Company
Act of 1940,236 the so-called “names rule,” which creates a prohibition for funds (including ETFs) from using “materially deceptive or misleading” names.237 The popularity of “thematic” ETFs
(one type of ESG variety) is undoubtedly a factor in the potential
regulatory reform.238 The comments received by the SEC were
varied, although there was wide industry support for retaining
investment manager discretion in the names they choose for their
offered investment products, even for ESG funds, given the wide
variance in how this term is interpreted.239 This is to be expected,

See Burgess, supra note 224.
236 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d).
237 See Press Release, SEC Requests Comment on Fund Names Rule;
Seeks to Eliminate Misleading Fund Names (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.sec
.gov/news/press-release/2020-50 [https://perma.cc/TB4V-G5YX] (“The rule requires
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suggesting that the fund focuses on a particular type of investment (e.g., ‘stocks’ or
‘bonds’) to invest at least 80% of its assets accordingly. Market and other developments since adoption of the rule, such as increasing use of derivatives, impact
the rule’s application.”); RE:FILE NO. S7-04-20, supra note 217, at 3 (requesting
comments regarding Section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940).
238 See Daren Fonda, SEC Cracks Down on Fund Names, BARRON’S (Mar. 6,
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239 See RE:FILE NO. S7-04-20, supra note 217, at 5; T. ROWE PRICE, ASSOC.,
RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 1 (May 21,
2020); STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND
NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 2–3 (May 5, 2020); INV. CO. INST., RE: REQUEST
FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 3 (May 5, 2020); TCHR.
INS. AND ANNUITY ASS’N OF AM., RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—
FILE NO. S7-04-20, 1–2 (May 5, 2020); COUNCIL OF INST. INV., RE: REQUEST
FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 2–3 (May 5, 2020); INVESCO,
LTD., RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 4–5
(May 5, 2020); BLACKROCK, RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—
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since as noted, the investment industry does not have an incentive to increase the ease of comparability since it will lower fund
switching costs for investors.240 However, there was also support
for applying the names rule to ESG investing at large.241 There
were also reasonable arguments submitted that the eighty percent holding requirement in Rule 35d-1(d)(2) should be applied
to ESG specific “themed” funds since these “reflect an investment focus on a particular industry or group of industries.”242
The SEC’s Spring 2021 regulatory agenda included a shortterm review of requirements for funds and advisors in relation to
ESG claims and disclosures, and public comment on index providers, and a long-term priority to amend Rule 35d-1.243 It is critical
that any amendments cover ESG “strategies” and “objectives” to
avoid a fund manager work around, and also commercial ESG indices.244 A workable taxonomy within the subvarieties of ESG funds,
including clarity on the definition of sustainability terms, will
undoubtedly improve comparability of ESG ETFs.245 An effort to
standardize and define sustainable terminology in a “classification

MORNINGSTAR, RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S704-20, 1–3 (May 5, 2020).
240 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
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whether funds consider themselves investment policies or strategies .... Any
investment making claims of ESG or sustainability should be required to
invest at least 80 percent of its assets per the ESG investment strategy, policy
or objective suggested by its name, and be required to make additional disclosures as to the particular qualitative and/or quantitative characteristics of its
investments.”).
242 CAP. RSCH. AND MGMT. CORP., RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND
NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 5 (May 5, 2020); see PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INV., RE: REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON FUND NAMES—FILE NO. S7-04-20, 3
(May 5, 2020) (“[S]ome funds indeed invest to advance a certain goal, such as
goals relating to climate neutrality or gender diversity (in addition to integrating
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243 See John S. Marten et al., Regulatory Agenda Highlights Potential SEC
Rulemaking Topics, NAT’L L. REV. (July 7, 2021), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/regulatory-agenda-highlights-potential-sec-rulemaking-topics [https://
perma.cc/ZV2L-CRX2].
244 See Fonda, supra note 238.
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framework” that funds can self-select into is a worthy undertaking.246 To this end, numerous potential naming taxonomies are
evolving, which the regulator could consider.247
In the interim, before developing a taxonomical solution, the
SEC, and global regulators, can greatly aid in investors comparability in ESG ETFs by requiring a fund to justify its use of
ESG-related terminology in its name in its specific ETF disclosures, and this suggestion received significant support in SEC
comment letters on Rule 35d-1.248 In other words, if a fund uses a
specific sustainable term in its name, it must also specifically disclose how it justifies this name usage.249 MSCI, Inc., in its May 5,
2020, comment letter on Rule 35d-1 provided a useful framework
for an ETF justifying its choice of fund name in its disclosures:
Such a disclosure should include (1) the fund’s criteria for the
ESG terms it uses in its name; (2) the methodology the fund
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NAMES FILE NO. S7-04-20, 4 (May 5, 2020) (“[A]ny fund that uses ESG in its
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enable them to make their investment decisions in alignment with their investment objectives, including investing in a socially responsible way.”); GLOB.
AFF. ASSOC., supra note 241, 3–4 (“At the very least, any investment making
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employs to support its defined criteria, (3) the metrics the fund
uses to validate that it satisfies its criteria and methodology, and
(4) historical evidence or metrics to back test that tend to substantiate the effectiveness of the methodology, or a warning to
investors that historical evidence to support the effectiveness
of the fund’s methodology is unavailable.250

Ideally, justifying disclosures would be included in both the ETF’s
prospectus and in a uniform layout style and presentation format (determined by the regulator) on the ETF issuers website,
so that such information is easily comparable between funds.251
B. Step Two: Standardize ESG ETF Measurement Metrics
As noted by Dana Reiser and Anne Tucker, ESG investing
is highly non-standardized,252 and the “substance” of ESG investing is “essentially unregulated,” which introduces significant
investor and consumer protection concerns.253 Industry driven ESG
scoring systems vary on the basis of “different frameworks, measures, key indicators and metrics, data use, qualitative judgement,
and weighting of subcategories,”254 as well as “wide differences
in factor subcategories below the E, S, and G, the number of metrics, their weighting and subjective judgment” which impact the
ability of investors to compare ETFs side by side.255 Given the
exceptional investor interest in this product segment, significant
regulatory efforts in the United States should be made to standardize ESG measurement metrics.256
By way of comparison, a temperature analogous or caloricstyle reference mechanism would help consumers of ESG ETFs
compare products.257 One of the challenges in “negative screen”
ETFs, which exclude certain categories like tobacco or firearms,
is that there is no way for them to track their actual ESG impact.258
Scoring metrics are being produced by industry, but diverse
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measurement metrics seems to be growing at a similar rate as
the products themselves.259 ETF data aggregator TrackInsight
recently noted that globally there are now “more than 125 ESG
data providers” who have distinct scoring methodologies.260
Industry competition on a preferred ESG scoring metric
benchmark compounds the information acquisition and synthesis
costs, and comparative complexity highlighted by this Article.261
Not only does an ESG ETF investor face a nearly insurmountable task in comparing products,262 but they also have a second
order (equally daunting) challenge of comparing and evaluating
distinct ESG scoring systems altogether!263 Given the nascent
popularity of this investment asset subclass, regulatory invention—informed by industry consultation—to standardize ESG
scoring metrics is urgently needed.264
Standardized measurement metrics could include uniform
disclosures on whether an ESG ETF uses its proxy voting power
in accordance with their underlying ESG initiative or stated objective.265 Such disclosure should be easily identifiable through
consistent reporting and uniform information presentation (pursuant to step three below).266 It’s important for an investor to
understand the correlation between an ETF’s stated intent and
its actual actions through proxy voting, and an investor focused
regulatory structure should lower information barriers to ascertaining this data.267 For example, research from Morningstar
has revealed “varying degrees of intentionality” in the proxy voting
actions of gender diversity ETFs, and in many cases gender or
diversity themed ETFs public statements don’t align with their
voting records.268
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A uniform, standardized reporting mechanism around objective aligned voting measures would greatly aid informed comparability in ESG ETFs.269 Undoubtedly a top-down regulatory
framework will need extensive industry consultation and serious
attempts at international consistency; however, such measures
are desperately needed in what is perhaps the hottest investment
sector at the moment.270 Also, as advocated by the OECD, metrics in reporting frameworks should also be “consistent,” “transparent,” and “comparable”—ideally across internationally issued
ESG ETF products.271 Standardized metrics should contemplate
sector specific subcategories within each “pillar” of E, S and G
respectively.272 Further, standardized metric systems should
contemplate both financial and nonfinancial “materiality” determinations so that investors can assess the effects of ESG factors
on financial performance.273
C. Step Three: Uniform Information Presentation Style on
Websites
Standardized marketing and website layout (uniform information presentation) measures that can reduce information

/gender-and-diversity-funds-intentional-or-not [https://perma.cc/V94Z-NKSX]
(the study included proxy voting record of three ETFs having a primary focus
on gender diversity including the State Street SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity
ETF (SHE); Serenity Shares’ Impact ETF; and Impact Shares YWCA Women’s
Empowerment ETF (WOMN) and found that they failed to support numerous
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as noted in the study, “Of the three gender diversity funds reviewed, the voting
record for State Street’s SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity ETF is the least supportive of shareholder resolutions addressing gender and diversity, which seems at
odds with the investment objective stated in the fund’s prospectus.”).
269 See BOFFO & PATALANO, supra note 11, at 59 (identifying issues that
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273 Id. at 63–64.

482 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:441
gathering and synthesis costs in ESG ETFs are critically needed.274
There are effective measures that could be easily instituted by
the SEC that would greatly aid comparability in ESG ETFs.275
An immediate step would be to mandate uniform website disclosure presentation format on ETF issuer sites, including standardized layout (where the information shows up on each site in
the same place and in the same format) and includes consistent
content, ideally even enhanced with constituent color coding for
easy interpretation.276
Investment decision-making is made more efficient when
disclosures are presented in a comparative format.277 Given the
hyper-competitive, fee sensitive nature of the industry, ETF
issuers do not have incentives to standardize information
presentation format on their own.278 Neither do ETF issuers
have incentives to make ETFs easier to compare because this
lowers the switching costs that investors face through information acquisition and synthesis.279 As a result, investment
issue website “optimal layouts” have been described as a “collective action problem” in prior scholarship, and thus requires a
regulatory solution.280
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Previous literature has illustrated the disparity and discretion currently in ETF issuer website layouts, and how this harms
ETF investor comparisons.281 Having a uniform layout allows for
an easier investor comparison between ESG ETFs.282 The ideal uniform content for ESG ETFs would include a description of the “type”
of ESG amongst a defined menu of available types (for example
exclusionary, best-in-class, full integration, or thematic),283 combined with a “qualitative” description of how the fund integrates
ESG considerations.284
You can see the problem of layout disparity by simply looking
at similar types of ESG ETFs issued by different fund managers,
as illustrated by the following example. Consider five proprietarily
constituted U.S. Equity “Total Market” ETFs that select their constituent index on the basis of ESG considerations, issued respectively,
by New York Life Investments,285 FlexShares,286 Nationwide,287

See Clements, Exchange-Traded Confusion, supra note 9, at 183 (“A
structured layout was not required under the new rule, despite having significant industry support for a standardized approach. Given layout discretion,
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WisdomTree,288 PIMCO,289 and BlackRock.290 The issuer websites
for these ESG ETF products are markedly different, and although
they contain the required disclosures pursuant to securities law,291
they present information, including where it’s placed on the website,
in very distinct ways.292 There is no investor protection justification for this lack of standardization, and with the extreme growth of
ETFs (and ESG varieties in particular) a uniform layout rule
would be very beneficial for investors.293
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued comparability in ESG ETFs is a
critical problem—even bigger than purported greenwashing.294
One analyst recently compared the conundrum investors face when
attempting to assess ESG ETFs to “archaeologists excavating fund
fact documents for buried truths.”295 Another advisor compared
himself to “Indiana Jones” in the process of finding the right
ETFs for his client.296 Independent of the merits of ESG investing, which is currently a matter of scholarly debate,297 and is in
need of additional empirical studies, high demand for sustainable ETFs and the concurrent proliferation of available products
demands a regulatory solution to prevent against investor harm
and capital and risk misallocation.298 The current system favors
the issuers of ETF products, not the investors.299
It is not obvious that ESG ETFs are being deceptively
“greenwashed.”300 In fact, when reviewing the myriad of ESG ETF
products increasingly available on the market, and the research
undertaken to date on this subject, it appears that ESG considerations are being integrated in some way.301 Further, ETF issuers
face the damaging prospect of reputational risk from greenwashing in a hyper-competitive, low-margin market, which effectively
costs an investor nothing to switch funds in the highly liquid, easily
accessible investment segment that is ETFs.302 While nondeceptive practices of asset managers are observable in the zero sum,
highly competitive, asset management game of capturing new
ESG-directed capital flows, the subjectivity that ETF managers use
to integrate ESG considerations into the composition of underlying ETF holdings is so disparate that investors face tremendous
information acquisition and synthesis costs and difficulty comparing products.303
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The concept of ESG can be interpreted in so many different non-standardized ways that it is tremendously difficult to
compare products side by side.304 This dilemma grows as product
choice expands, and with the current level of investor interest in
sustainable investment products, increased product choice seems
like an inevitability.305 Without an effective regulatory solution,
investors and advisors will continue to encounter steepening information acquisition costs and comparative complexity when
attempting to make informed choices.306 These ex ante barriers
to investment decision-making greatly enhance the likelihood of
capital and risk misallocation.307 As such, this Article has advocated for three immediate steps to improve investor protection:
first, funds should justify their use of ESG-related terminology in
their name through specific, uniform ETF disclosures, including on
their website;308 second, regulators must develop standardized and
consistent ESG measurement metrics and terminology;309 and
third, ETF issuers should disclose ESG information on their websites in a consistent layout and presentation style to aid investor
comparability.310 These three steps will lower the costs of information synthesis for ESG ETF investors, and allow them to more
easily compare funds side-by-side resulting in more efficient capital
and risk allocation.
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